

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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Control:

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FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1423, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON PRIORITY 60,
ROME PRIORITY 22, PARIS PRIORITY 85, BONN PRIORITY 22, TEL AVIV
PRIORITY 52, BRUSSELS PRIORITY 66, BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 31,

RE: EICHMANN CASE

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY TODAY'S ACTIVITIES ON EICHMANN CASE:

1. WE CALLED ORTIZ DE ROZAS (ARGENTINA) EARLY THIS MORNING TO
TELL HIM WE HAD ASKED ITALY LATE TO BE THIRD PARTY IN ARRANGING
BEN-GURION - FRONDIKI MEETING AND POSTPONEMENT SC. HE SAID
AMADEO HAD TALKED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AGAIN AT 4 AM THIS
MORNING, THAT FORMIN HAD SAID NO MEETING WAS IN PROSPECT AND
REITERATED INSTRUCTIONS TO AMADEO TO GO AHEAD WITH SC MEETING.

2. WE NEXT MET WITH UK AND FRENCH DELS. BERARD REPORTED HE HAD
JUST RECEIVED TELEPHONE CALL FROM COMAY (ISRAEL) CONVEYING
CONVERSATION COMAY HAD JUST HAD WITH EYTAN (ISRAEL) IN PARIS.
EYTAN SAID BEN-GURION - FRONDIKI MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR 6
PM JUNE 24 IN BRUSSELS AND THAT AMADEO WOULD BE INSTRUCTED NOT TO
OPPOSE POSTPONEMENT OF SC. HE SAID THIS HAD BEEN ARRANGED BY
ISRAELI AMB IN BERN, WHO SAW FRONDIKI YESTERDAY. WE THEN DISCUSSED
HOW TO PROCEED TO ARRANGE POSTPONEMENT. WE AGREED WE SHOULD
CONTINUE TO TRY TO WORK THROUGH ORTONA WITH OBJECTIVE POSTPONE-
MENT OF WHOLE MEETING AS FIRST PREFERENCE, POSTPONEMENT AFTER
ADOPTION OF AGENDA AND BEFORE PARTIES SPOKE AS SECOND, AND
ADJOURNMENT AFTER PARTIES HAD SPOKEN AS THIRD.

RECIPIENT OF THIS CABLE IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING
RECORD OR DESTRUCTION AND
DISPOSITION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH CSI#51-11.13 Aug. 1957

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3. INASMUCH
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201-47132

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM FROM NEW YORK

3. INASMUCH AS REPORTS ON SITUATION CONTINUED TO BE CONFLICTING WE ALSO CONSIDERED WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT RES IF WE WERE FACED WITH IT. I SAID WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO VOTE FOR ARGENTINE RES AS IT STOOD BUT TO ASK FOR CHANGES CONTAINED DEPCIRTEL 1589 AND THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO SEE FURTHER CHANGES ALONG LINES UK AND FRENCH WANTED IF AMADEO WOULD ACCEPT THEM.

4. DIXON SAID UK POSITION WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE RES TOLERABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AND ON WHICH US, UK AND FRENCH COULD ALL VOTE SAME WAY. THEY THEREFORE THOUGHT RES INTRODUCED BY THIRD PARTY WOULD BE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS. UK WOULD LIKE ADDITION OF PARAS COVERING SAME TWO POINTS AS US INSTRUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, LAST PARA OF ARGENTINE DRAFT CAUSED UK GREAT DIFFICULTY, ESPECIALLY IN ITS REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHARTER, AND HE DID NOT KNOW HOW UK WOULD VOTE ON IT.

5. BERARD SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE THAT FRANCE HOPED TO AVOID SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO END UP ON SIDE OF EITHER PARTY. PREFERENCE WAS THERE BE NO SC AND PARTIES RESOLVE ISSUE DIRECTLY. RE TEXT, HE AGREED WITH UK. IF LAST PARA OF ARGENTINE RES ADOPTED AS IT WAS THIS WOULD PRESENT NEW PROBLEMS OF MORE DANGEROUS AND DIFFICULT NATURE BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN CALL FOR RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE TO ARGENTINES WHO MIGHT ULTIMATELY BRING ISSUE BACK TO SC. FRANCE WOULD HAVE GREATEST HESITATION IN VOTING FOR IT AND WOULD WANT TO SEE AMENDMENTS MADE TO THIS PARA. (IN SUBSEQUENT MEETING BERARD READ OUT DRAFT FRENCH TEXT OF RES, OPERATIVE PARAS OF WHICH TOOK NOTE OF REGRETS EXPRESSED BY ISRAEL IN SC AND CONSIDERED THAT THROUGH THESE REGRETS ISRAEL HAD OFFERED MORAL REPARATION TO ARGENTINA.) HE STRONGLY URGED ORTONA PUSH THESE AMENDMENTS BUT SAID HE HAD NO AUTHORITY PUT THEM FORWARD HIMSELF.)

6. I SAID I WOULD BE GLAD TO HOLD UP OUR COMMENTS ON RES TO ARGENTINES, AS I HAD ALREADY DONE FOR TWO DAYS, UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN OPPORTUNITY FOR ORTONA OR SOMEONE ELSE TO URGE FURTHER CHANGES IN RES. I WOULD HOWEVER HAVE TO TALK TO AMADEO BEFORE THE END OF THE DAY, AND AT THAT TIME I WOULD TELL HIM US WOULD

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201-47132

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM FROM NEW YORK

LIKE TO SEE HIM ACCEPT SUCH FURTHER CHANGES AS MIGHT BE PROPOSED BY UK, FRANCE AND ITALY, BUT OF COURSE I COULD NOT PRESS HIM TO TAKE THEM. THREE DELS THEN WENT TO SEE ORTONA (ITALY).

7. (ORTONA SAID HE HAD HAD NO RESPONSE FROM ROME ABOUT APPROACH TO FRONZIZI WE HAD ASKED ITALIANS TO MAKE (USUN 1420). AFTER FILLING ORTONA IN ON ISRAELI REPORT ABOUT AGREED BEN-GURION - FRONZIZI MEETING, BERARD ASKED HIM WHETHER ITALY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASK FOR ADJOURNMENT OF SC SESSION. ORTONA SAID HE WOULD NEED AGREEMENT OF ARGENTINA TO DO THIS AND THAT WHILE HE WAS IN POSITION TO ASK FOR ADJOURNMENT AFTER ITEM INSCRIBED AND WITH ARGENTINE PERMISSION, HE COULD NOT ASK FOR ADJOURNMENT AHEAD OF TIME UNLESS HE HAD NEW INSTRUCTIONS. HOWEVER, HE WAS WILLING TO TELL AMADEO ABOUT ISRAELI NEWS ON BEN-GURION - FRONZIZI MEETING. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM DIXON ORTONA ALSO SAID HE AGREED IT WAS PREFERABLE THAT RES BE INTRODUCED BY THIRD PARTY AND THAT HE WAS WILLING TO ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE MODIFIED RES WITH AMADEO BUT COULD NOT BE SPONSOR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID HE HAD CABLED TWICE REGARDING SPONSORSHIP BUT WAS NOT PERSONALLY FAVORABLE TO IT. DIXON THEN SUGGESTED CEYLON AS POSSIBILITY.

8. US, UK AND FRANCE THEN OUTLINED RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON RES AS OUTLINED ABOVE. ORTONA SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO STAY CLOSE TO ARGENTINA. HE KNEW FRENCH PROPOSALS WOULD BE UNPALATABLE TO AMADEO BUT HE THOUGHT AMADEO WAS WILLING TO SEE THIRD PARTY RES. AMADEO COULD ACCEPT REFERENCE TO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EICHMANN CASE IF PROPERLY WORDED. HE COULD NOT ACCEPT DELETION OF "REPARATION" AND IF IT WERE TO BE QUALIFIED IN ANY WAY, HE WANTED IT QUALIFIED IN DIRECTION OF CALLING FOR RETURN OF EICHMANN; IT WOULD NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO SAY ISRAELI APOLOGY WAS SUFFICIENT REPARATION.

9. I THEN CIRCULATED COPIES OF US AMENDMENTS (DEPGIRTEL-1589). DIXON SAID THESE WERE NOT COMPLETELY IN LINE WITH UK AND FRENCH POSITIONS. I THEN AGAIN AGREED TO HOLD THEM UP UNTIL ORTONA HAD

HAD

CONFIDENTIAL

-4- 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM FROM NEW YORK

HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH AMADEO ABOUT FURTHER CHANGES. ORTONA THEN SAID HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK AMADEO INTO RES IN WHICH OPERATIVE PARAS (A) RECOGNIZED ARGENTINA ENTITLED TO ADEQUATE REPARATION, (B) TOOK COGNIZANCE OF ISRAEL'S POSITION IN SC, AND (C) CALLED FOR MAINTENANCE OF NORMAL RELATIONS. I HAD TO LEAVE AT THAT POINT FOR ANOTHER APPOINTMENT AND UK, FRANCE, AND ITALY THEN PREPARED DRAFT RES (USUN 1422), WHICH ORTONA SUBSEQUENTLY PUT TO AMADEO.

10. ORTONA HAD LUNCH WITH AMADEO AND TALKED TO ME IMMEDIATELY AFTER LUNCH. HE ASKED AMADEO ABOUT BEN-GURION STATEMENT, WHICH BY THEN WAS IN PRESS, THAT BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED, AND GAVE HIM DETAILS FROM FRENCH. AMADEO REPEATED INFORMATION HE HAD GIVEN ORTONA EARLIER AND WHICH ORTIZ DE ROSAS HAD GIVEN US, THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO GO AHEAD WITH SC SESSION. HE SAID HE HAD HAD NO OFFICIAL WORD ABOUT BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING. ORTONA THEN DISCUSSED REVISED RES WITH HIM BUT FOUND AMADEO'S REACTION TO BE THAT CHANGES WENT TOO FAR IN ISRAELI DIRECTION AND THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO STICK TO HIS OWN DRAFT.

11. ORTONA ALSO SAID HE HAD NOW RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ROME RE POSSIBLE ITALIAN THIRD PARTY INITIATIVE. ROME REPLIED THAT FRONDIZI WAS ALREADY OUT OF ITALY AND ROME DID NOT THINK THERE WAS ANYTHING FURTHER ITALY COULD DO. APPARENTLY ORTONA ALSO INSTRUCTED AGAIN TO STAY CLOSE TO ARGENTINE POSITION. IN CIRCUMSTANCES HE THOUGHT THERE WAS NOTHING FURTHER HE COULD DO WITH AMADEO.

12. I THEN RECEIVED CALL FROM COMAY (ISRAEL), WHO ALSO HAD TALKED EARLIER TO MISSION OFFICER. COMAY ASKED WHETHER US WOULD SUPPORT POSTPONEMENT MOTION IF MADE IN SC. I SAID WE HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT TO DO ABOUT POSTPONEMENT IF ARGENTINA WAS AGAINST IT. COMAY SAID SUCH MOTION WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN. HE EXPRESSED VIEW IT WOULD BE SERIOUS MATTER IF US TOOK RESPONSIBILITY OF CONTINUING COUNCIL MEETING. BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING AND SC MEETING DID NOT MIX. QUESTION COULD BE SOLVED "IN OR OUT OF COURT" BUT NOT IN BOTH PLACES.

13. COMAY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5- 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM FROM NEW YORK

13. COMAY THEN ASKED IF ARGENTINA WENT AHEAD AND SUBMITTED DRAFT RES WHAT US WOULD DO. I SAID WE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT IT. WE THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE AMENDMENTS WHICH TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION SOME OF ISRAELI POINTS AND WE INTENDED TO URGE THEM BUT THAT UNDER OUR INSTRUCTIONS WE WOULD VOTE FOR ARGENTINE TEXT IN PRESENT FORM IF SO SUBMITTED. COMAY SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE OPPOSED TO ANY FORMULA INCORPORATING CONCEPT OF REPARATION.

14. COMAY THEN STATED THAT WHAT HAPPENS TOMORROW MORNING WOULD HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE ON SC AND ON BEN-GURION, AND THAT GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES WERE INVOLVED. HE STRESSED THAT ANY STATEMENTS AMADEO MADE IN SC WOULD INFLUENCE ISRAELI ATTITUDE IN SC AND ALSO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. HE MADE SAME POINT ABOUT RES. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD SUGGEST TO AMADEO THAT RES NOT BE TABLED TOMORROW AND ALREADY HAD IMPRESSION AMADEO WOULD AGREE TO THIS FROM OUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS. (EARLIER COMAY TOLD MISSION OFFICER THAT IF RES WAS PUT IN OFFICIALLY IT WOULD PREJUDICE PROSPECTS FOR BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR BEN-GURION TO NEGOTIATE WITH RES MADE PUBLIC; IF DEBATE BEGAN OR RES TABLED THIS WOULD AFFECT AND PROBABLY PRECLUDE SUCH MEETING. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT SOMEONE TAKE INITIATIVE TO AVOID SC. HE DID NOT THINK ITALY WAS RIGHT PARTY TO TAKE LEAD IN VIEW OF ITS PAST ASSOCIATIONS.)

15. I THEN SAW AMADEO. I TOLD HIM WE HAD HEARD BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED. AS HE KNEW WE THOUGHT IF THIS WAS CASE SC SHOULD BE POSTPONED. AMADEO SAID HE HAD NO OFFICIAL WORD OF SUCH MEETING AND REPEATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM FORMIN EARLY THIS MORNING TO CONTINUE WITH SC SESSION. AMADEO SAID THAT IF MOTION WERE MADE FOR POSTPONEMENT HE WOULD OPPOSE IT. HE ARGUED THAT SC MEETING WOULD ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR ANY BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SC MOVE RIGHT AHEAD AND FINISH ITS WORK ON RES BY THURS NOON. HE ALSO SAID HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND NOW PLANNED TO INTRODUCE RES IN HIS SPEECH WED MORNING, AS THIS WOULD LEND FOCUS TO DEBATE.

16. I REITERATED

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-6- 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM FROM NEW YORK

16. I REITERATED THAT WE THOUGHT SC MEETING SHOULD BE POSTPONED IF BEN-GURION - FRONDIKI MEETING ARRANGED. I ALSO REITERATED OUR PREFERENCE THAT HE NOT SUBMIT RES AT OPENING SESSION BECAUSE THIS MIGHT SHARPEN ISRAELI REACTION. HE REPLIED THAT ISRAELIS WOULD KNOW WHAT WAS IN RES ANYWAY, SO HE DOUBTED THIS WOULD MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE, BUT HE WOULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THIS.

17. CONCERNING TEXT OF RES, I TOLD HIM WE WERE AWARE OF DRAFT ORTONA HAD SHOWN HIM. WE SYMPATHIZED WITH STRONG DESIRES OF OTHER MEMBERS OF COUNCIL FOR FURTHER CHANGES IN RES AND HOPED HE WOULD GIVE THEM FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION IN HIS OWN INTERESTS. IN GENERAL WE WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY SUCH CHANGES THAT HE COULD. HE STATED THAT DRAFT SHOWN HIM BY ORTONA WENT TOO FAR AND HE FRANKLY DID NOT EVEN FEEL ABLE TO COMMUNICATE IT TO HIS GOVT. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT AS FAR AS OUR OWN INSTRUCTIONS WERE CONCERNED WE WERE IN POSITION TO VOTE FOR ORIGINAL DRAFT OF ARGENTINE RES IF HE INSISTED ON IT. HOWEVER, WE HAD TWO AMENDMENTS WHICH WE STRONGLY RECOMMENDED. HE LOOKED AT AMENDMENTS AND SAID THAT SUBJECT TO FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOVT HE WAS ENTIRELY CONFIDENT THEY WERE ACCEPTABLE. ON AMENDMENT RE EICHMANN, HE THOUGHT IT PREFERABLE TO USE ADJECTIVE OTHER THAN "HEINOUS", BUT THIS WAS DETAIL WE COULD CONSULT ABOUT. HE WOULD INCORPORATE THIS PARA IN HIS RES. RE PARA ON RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES, HE SAID THIS WAS TOTALLY ACCEPTABLE TO ARGENTINA BUT INASMUCH AS THIS WAS NORMALLY TYPE OF SUGGESTION THAT WOULD BE INTRODUCED BY AN INTERMEDIARY HE WONDERED IF SOME THIRD PARTY COULD INTRODUCE IT AS AMENDMENT; HE SAID HE WOULD THEN IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT IT AND INCORPORATE IT. HE SUGGESTED HE WOULD BE MOST HAPPY IF US WOULD BE WILLING TO DO THIS; OTHERWISE HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SPEAK TO ECUADOR, CEYLON OR SOMEONE ELSE. I SAID I WOULD BE GLAD TO CONSULT DEPT ABOUT POSSIBILITY OUR DOING IT.

18. AMADEO ALSO SAID HE EXPECTED TEN VOTES IN SC, WITH ONLY FRANCE ABSTAINING. CEYLONESE HAD CRITICIZED HIS RES BECAUSE IT WAS NOT STRONG ENOUGH.

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201-47132

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-7- 1423, JUNE 21, 11 PM FROM NEW YORK

19. IN LEAVING WE CAUTIONED HIM THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT FOR POSTPONEMENT OF SESSION IN LIGHT APPARENT AGREEMENT ON BEN-GURION - FRONDIKI MEETING AND ASKED HIM TO INFORM US WHEN HE HAD ANY FIRM INFORMATION ON IT.

20. FINAL EVENT OF AFTERNOON WAS CALL FROM ORTONA. HE SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ROME BASED ON APPROACH BY US AMB. HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO TELL AMADEO ITALY WOULD ASK FOR POSTPONEMENT ON BASIS US AMB STATEMENT THAT AMADEO HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT POSTPONEMENT IF MADE BY THIRD PARTY. AMB ORTONA SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW HE COULD SAY THIS TO AMADEO INASMUCH AS LATTER HAD TOLD BOTH HIMSELF AND US THAT HE WOULD OPPOSE POSTPONEMENT. AFTER CONSULTING DEPT WE TOLD HIM WE AGREED. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH BEELEY (UK) HE TOLD US HE SAW NO FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO POSTPONE SC UNTIL AFTER PARTIES HAD SPOKEN, AS LONG AS ARGENTINA CONTINUED TO OPPOSE IT, AS THERE SIMPLY WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH VOTES. THIS WAS SAME OPINION WE HAD ALREADY COME TO OURSELVES.

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